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VI. CIVIL PROCEDURE
Henry G. McMahon*
Jurisdiction Ratione Personae
Venue, which usually presents knotty questions for decision
by the supreme court, was the subject of only one case during the
past term, and that offering no particular difficulty. In Du Bell v.
Union Central Life Insurance Company,' suit was filed in Concordia Parish to recover damages sustained through the failure of
defendant to convey good title to a small parcel of land in that parish
which it had sold, along with a larger tract, to plaintiff. The former
was an Ohio insurance company licensed to do business in this state,
and as such its authorized agent for the service of all process upon
it in Louisiana was the secretary of state. Relying on the general
rule of suit at defendant's domicile, in the court below defendant
successfully excepted to the court's jurisdiction ratione personae,
contending that its Louisiana domicile was in East Baton Rouge
Parish, the official domicile of the secretary of state. Two arguments for the reversal of the judgment appealed from were presented by plaintiff: (1) that the suit was one for damages against

a corporation properly brought in the parish where the cause of
action arose; 2 and (2) that the action was one in warranty, the result
of litigation between plaintiff and a third party in which the defect
of title to the land was established, and hence the suit was properly
brought in the parish where the principal proceedings were had.'
The supreme court found it unnecessary to pass upon the second

argument, holding the first sufficient to require a reversal. In interpreting the language of the code provision relied on by plaintiff
"where any ... corporation shall fail to do anything for which an
*Acting Dean of the Law School and Professor of Law, Louisiana State
University.
1. 211 La. 165, 29 So. (2d) 708 (1947).
2. "In all cases where any person, firm, or domestic or foreign corporation
shall commit trespass, or do anything for which an action for damage lies or
where any domestic or foreign corporation shall fail to do anything for which an
action for damage lies, such person, firm or corporation may be sued in the
parish where such damage is done or trespass committed or at the domicile of
such person, firm or corporation." Art. 165 (9), La. Code of Practice of 1870, as
last amended by La. Act 282 of 1940.
3. "In matters relative to warranty, they must be carried before the court
having cognizance of the principal action in which demands in warranty arise.!
Art. 165 (4), La. Code of Practice of 1870, as last amended by La. Act 282 of
1940. See also Art. 888, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
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action for damage lies"4 sufficiently broad to include actions arising
ex contractu as well as ex delicto, the court went no further than
it had in previous cases. ' The decision appears entirely sound, and
the choice of forum permitted certainly appears to be the most
convenient one for all parties concerned. The prior litigation between plaintiff and third parties establishing the defect in the title
to the land in question, and which serves as the background of the
principal case, from the procedural viewpoint is as interesting as the
precise point presented.6
Amendment of Petition
Seale v. Stephens7 gives every indication of being another landmark decision in the field of pleading, as the court appears to have
gone much further in recognizing the rule of liberal amendment
of the petition than in any case decided heretofore. In the trial court
plaintiff sought to recover $1,100 property damage and $500 damages for personal injury as the result of an automobile accident
alleged to have been due to defendant's negligence. In his original
pleading, plaintiff alleged that the value of his automobile prior to
the collision was $1,100 and that it was wrecked completely in the
accident. During the trial of the case plaintiff's counsel discovered
that the car prior to the collision was worth $1,850, and that the
damages which it sustained through the accident depreciated its
value by $1,100, and orally offered to amend his petition so as to
state these facts. On objection by defendant, this tender of amendment was refused by the trial judge. After the conclusion of the
trial, however, the trial judge reconsidered the matter, concluded
that he had been in error in refusing to permit plaintiff to amend,
4,. Art. 165 (9), La. Code of Practice of 1870, as last amended by La. Act
282 of 1940.
5. City of Lafayette v. Wells Fargo & Co. Express, 129 La. 323, 56 So. 257
(1911); O'Brien v. Delta Air Corporation, 188 La. 911, 178 So. 489 (1938).
6. Prior to the principal case, plaintiff had filed a petitory action in Concordia Parish against the person in possession of the tract of land in question.
Upon this defendant setting up title to the property, plaintiff had attempted to
call the Union Central Life Insurance Company in warranty. This call in warranty was stricken upon the warrantor's objection, on the ground that the call
in warranty is available only when the vendee is made a defendant in litigation.
This technical action of the trial court appears to be required by the Louisiana
jurisprudence, construing the pertinent code provision, which narrowly limits the
scope of the procedural device. Art. 389, La. Code of Practice of 1870; Lusk v.
Swon, 9 La. Ann. 367 (1854); Foote v. Pharr, 115 La. 85, 38 So. 885 (1905).
For a comparison with the greater efficacy of the third party practice permitted
by Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Flory & McMahon, The
New Federal Rules and Louisiana Practice (1938) 1 LoUISIANA LAW Rzvizw
45, 58.
7. 210 La. 1068, 29 So. (2d) 65 (1946).
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and rendered judgment for the latter for $300 personal injuries and
for $1,100 for the damage sustained by his automobile.
On appeal,8 the Court of Appeal for the First Circuit agreed
generally with the trial judge's reasons for judgment, but could not
affirm the judgment for property damage since plaintiff's pleadings
did not support this item. Accordingly, it affirmed the judgment
appealed from insofar as the award for personal injuries was concerned, but otherwise reversed the decision because of its inclusion
of the item of property damage. On this point, the intermediate
appellate court concluded that the trial judge committed reversible
error in refusing to allow plaintiff to amend his petition, and remanded the case to permit such amendment and to allow both
parties to introduce evidence on this issue.
The supreme court granted certiorari to review the court of
appeal's decision, but after consideration of the question affirmed
the latter's judgment. This clear-cut recognition of plaintiff's right
to amend his petition even after the trial has commenced, when the
interests of justice require it, is a most salutary one. While the
intermediate appellate courts twice have found a way to brush aside
technical objections to amendment after the commencement of the
trial,9 none of the supreme court's decisions have gone as far as in
the principal case,' and the majority of its cases have announced a
contrary rule."' The prime impediment to amendment after the
case is called for trial heretofore has been the announced prohibition
against amendments "which retard the progress of the litigation."
By implication at least, the older cases have regarded the expedition
of litigation as a more desirable social result than the attainment of
justice itself, and their technical positions in effect have granted one
8, Seale v. Stephens, 24 So. (2d) 651 (La. App. 1946).
9. Triggs v. George, 4 La. App. 419 (1926); Horrell v. Gulf & Valley Cotton
Oil Co., 15 La. App. 603, 181 So. 709 (1980). Cf. Chagnard v. Schiro, 156 So.
58 (La. App. 1934). But see Collins v. Heath, 15 La. App. 870, 131 So. 479
(1930), where amendment after trial had begun was refused as coming too late.
10. "The case must be an extraordinary one, that will justify the reception
of an amendment after the trial has commenced, and such amendment must not
be calculated to produce delay." Dabbs v. Hemken, 3 Rob. 123, 126 (La. 1842).
Amendment permitted after case submitted, to permit plaintiff to rebut presumption of waiver of interest by amending his petition to claim interest expressly, when new evidence not required. Lotz v. Hurwitz, 174 La. 638, 141 So.
83 (1932). Amendment of petition granted, even after some evidence had been
taken, when made seven months before the actual trial of the case. Ruiz v.
American Trading Co. of New Orleans, 167 La. 28, 118 So. 597 (1928). Cf. State
v. Bozeman, 156 La. 635, 101 So. 4 (1924) and cases cited therein.
11. Gravier's Curator v. Cullion, 11 La. 269 (1837); Dabbs v. Hemken, 3
Rob. 123 (La. 1842); Cohn & Bruen v. Levy, 14 La. Ann. 855 (1859); Sevin &
Gourdain v. Caillouet, 30 La. Ann. 528 (1878).
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litigant vested rights in the mistakes of his adversary's counsel. The
principal case recognizes more valid objectives of the administration of justice.
Exceptions
The trite rule that the well-pleaded allegations of the petition
are deemed to be true for purposes of the trial of an exception of
no cause of action found annual application in six cases.' Despite
such application, however, the court disposed of some of these cases
by maintaining defendants' exceptions.
The plaintiff in Losavio v. Losavio Realty Company1" brought
suit to recover an interest in his mother's share of certain community property, of which plaintiff was alleged to have been defrauded by reason of his father's transfer thereto to a family holding
company in anticipation of his mother's death. Since the pleader's
legal conclusion of fraud was not supported by the factual allegations of the petition, defendants' exception of no cause of action
was maintained. Further, finding that plaintiff had received from
his father adequate consideration for the settlement of the former's
entire interest in his mother's succession, the court maintained defendants' exception of no right of action as well.
State ex rel. Whitfield v. Municipal Fireand Police Civil Service
Board"' presented an appeal from judgment below maintaining
exceptions of no right and cause of action. Plaintiff's suit was won
for mandamus to compel the Civil Service Boagd of Monroe to grant
plaintiff an appeal from an adverse ruling of the board respecting
plaintiff's seniority. The factual allegations of the petition merely
alleged the error of the ruling and did not meet the statutory limitation of judicial review only in cases where the board's ruling was
not made in good faith. The judgment appealed from was affirmed.
12. Weber v. H. G. Hill Stores, 210 La. 977, 29 So. (2d) 83 (1946); Nyman
v. Monteleone-Iberville Garage, 211 La. 875, 30 So. (2d) 123 (1947); State ex rel.
Whitfield v. Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board, 81 So. (2d) 178 (La.
1947); Losavio v. Losavio Realty Co, 81 So. (2d) 412. (La. 1947); Roccaforte v.
Barbin, 31 So. (2d) 521 (La. 1947); Board of Com'rs v. Trouilley, 81 So. (2d)
700 (La. 1947). The rule is stated too broadly in some of the cases as being at
plicable to the trial of the exception of no right of action also. Since the defendant's evidence on the trial of the latter exception may break the force of plaintiff's allegations, the rule applies to the trial of the exception of no right of
action only when this exception is levelled at the face of plaintiff's petition, and
defendant introduces no evidence on the trial of exception. In this connection,
compare Losavio v. Losavio Realty Co., supra; Ritsch Alluvial Land Co. v.
Adema, 211 La. 625, 80 So. (2d) 753 (1947).
18. 81 So. (2d) 412 (La. 1947).
14. 81 So. (2d) 178 (La. 1947).
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In Nyman v. Monteleone-lberville Garage,15 a widow sued to
recover damages for the wrongful death of her husband through
the alleged negligence of an employee of the named defendant. The
casualty insurer of the owner of the death car, which was being
taken to the garage for storage at the time of the accident, also was
made a defendant on the theory that under the omnibus provision
affording protection to anyone legally using the car with the permission of the owner, the negligent employee of the garage was an
"insured" under the policy. Since the policy sued on expressly excluded from the coverage any employee of a public garage, the
insurer's exception of no cause of action was maintained.
"Very complicated and confusing" proceedings were presented
in Treigle Sash Factory v. Saladino,6 where plaintiff brought two
separate suits both seeking the possession of commercial premises
leased by plaintiff to defendant's intestate. Two leases were involved, the first covering the period July 1, 1942-June 30, 1945, and
the second for the term of July 1, 1945-June 30, 1948, both containing identical provisions, except that the second lease granted the
lessee an option to renew for an additional two-year period. On
April 16, 1945, the building on the leased premises was damaged
to a considerable extent by fire, but the evidence showed that it
might have been restored to its former condition for a sum representing a fraction of its actual value. The lessee died on some date
during the existence of the first lease not shown by the opinion, and
both suits were brought primarily against the administratrix of his
succession.
In the first suit, filed on June 11, 1945, plaintiff presented two
demands in the alternative: (1) for injunctive relief to prevent
defendant from interfering with plaintiff's possession of the premises, on the theory that the lease had been terminated by the fire;
and (2) for a judgment for the full amount of the rent payable
under the second lease, under an accelerating clause maturing the
full rent on the death of the lessee. The trial judge rejected plaintiff's primary demand on the ground that mere damage, rather
than destruction, did not give lessor any right to cancel the lease,
and this action of the court a qua was affirmed on appeal. The
alternative demand of this suit was disposed of by the supreme
court by maintaining defendant's exception of no cause of action.
On this point the court held that since the second lease was not in
15. 211 La. 875, 80 So. (2d) 128 (1947).
16. 81 So. (2d) 172 (La. 1947).

266
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effect at the time suit was filed, in effect it presented a demand for
a declaratory judgment not recognized by Louisiana law.17 It is
extremely difficult to follow the reasoning of the court on this
phase of the case. An ordinary judgment has two aspects: (1) a
declaration of the rights of the parties, usually implied; and (2) an
award. The declaratory judgment makes no award, but is merely
declaratory of the rights of the parties.' 8 The judgment for $6,840,
interest and attorney's fees, rendered by the trial court for the full
rent under the second lease very definitely was an award. Presumably what the court meant to hold was that plaintiff's alternative demand in the first suit was premature. 9 Procedurally, however, there is a great deal of difference between the two theories.
In the second suit, filed on July 24, 1945, the plaintiff brought
ejectment proceedings based on alternative causes of action: (1)
that defendant had failed to pay the rent due under the second
lease in accordance with its provisions; and (2) that the second
lease had been cancelled by the fire on April 16, 1945. The trial
judge had dismissed this suit by maintaining defendant's exception
of lis pendens. The supreme court properly held that the causes
of action in the two suits were not identical, 2° overruled the exception and remanded the second suit for further proceedings.
The exception of lis pendens was under consideration by the
supreme court in another case. 2 ' A habeas corpus proceeding
brought by a mother to obtain the custody and possession of her
minor child was held not barred by the pendency of an adoption
proceeding in the juvenile court in which the defendant sought to
adopt the child legally.
17. With the single exception noted, Louisiana procedure does not recognize
the declaratory judgment. New Orleans & N. E. R. Co. v. Louisiana Const. &
Imp. Co., 49 La. Ann. 49, 21 So. 171 (1897); McMahon, Louisiana Practice (1939)
58-65; Lee, The Declaratory Judgments Act, 20 Tulane L. Rev. 566 (1946).
Under Section 4 of the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act (La. Act 20
of 1914, § 1 (4) as amended) employer and employee may, prior to any accident.
submit to the district court for determination the question of whether the employer's business, though not deemed within the statutory definition of a hazardous business, is in fact hazardous.
18. Millar, Notauilia of American Civil Procedure 1887-1937 (1937) 50 Harv.
L. Rev. 1017, 1056.
19. This presents an extremely difficult procedural question: Was this claim
for the entire rent payable under the second lease an obligation presently in
existence but not yet exigible because the term of payment had not elapsed, or
was it an obligation dependent upon a suspensive condition? If the former,
defendant should have filed an exception of prematurity; if the latter, the point
can be raised by the exception of no cause of action. On these points, see
McMahon, Louisiana Practice (1939) 341-349.
20. Cf. Art. 94, La. Code of Practice of 1870, as amended by La. Act 62 of
1918.
21. State ex rel. Simpson v. Salter, 31 So. (2d) 163 (La. 1947).
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The exception of no cause of action was overruled by the appellate court in two cases. In Roccaforte v. Barbin, 2 plaintiff had
filed suit to annul an offer to purchase real estate which had been
accepted by the defendant wife alone, and to recover plaintiff's
deposit made thereunder. In view of the petition's recital that the
property in question was acquired in the names of both defendant
husband and wife, and hence was community property, the defendants' exception was overruled. The community property aspect of
the case will be discussed elsewhere.23 In Board of Commissioners
v. Trouille,24 plaintiff brought suit to enjoin defendant from interfering with necessary spillway construction on certain lands appropriated by plaintiff board under authority of special statute.2 5 From
the trial judge's refusal to grant injunctive relief and dismissing
plaintiff's suit, the latter litigant appealed. The appellate court,
finding that the exceptions did not aver the unconstitutionality of
the special statute, refused to consider this issue. Since the petition
recited a substantial compliance with the statutory provisions, the
judgment appealed from was reversed, the exceptions overruled,
and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
The plaintiff in Sansing v. Rapides Parish School Board"6
sought to enjoin the issuance and delivery of school bonds on the
ground that the defendant board had not been created validly, and
that hence the subsequent election to authorize the issuance of the
bonds was illegal. In the trial court defendant filed exceptions of
prescription and no right of action to the suit, both levelled at the
fact that the suit was barred by the constitutional peremption,27 not
having been filed within sixty days of the election. The trial court's
judgment maintaining these exceptions was affirmed on appeal.
The exception of no right of action was employed by the defendant in Ritsch Alluvial Land Company v. Adema to dispose of
the case without going to trial on the merits. The proceedings were
brought to annul the tax sale of certain lands formerly belonging
to plaintiff, and which had been acquired by defendant, on grounds
not pertinent here. The defendant filed its exception, and subsequently on the trial thereof forced plaintiff to produce an instrument
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
(E.S.)
28.

31 So. (2d) 521 (La. 1947).
See p. 210, supra.
31 So. (2d) 700 (La. 1947).
La. Act 287 of 1940.
31 So. (2d) 169 (La. 1947).
La. Const. of 1921, Art. XIV, § 14(n).
§ 43.
211 La. 675, 30 So. (2d) 758 (1947).

See also La. Act 46 of 1921

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. Vill

evidencing the fact that prior to the institution of the suit plaintiff
had quitclaimed its right, title and interest in the land to another.
Prior to the trial of this exception, to avert disaster plaintiff attempted to amend its petition by having its grantee made a party
plaintiff, but defendant met this maneuver with an exception of
prescription of five years levelled at the tardy demand of the grantee.
Both exceptions were maintained by the trial court, and the suit
dismissed. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed on appeal.
Appellate Jurisdictions
Only three decisions involving this subject were handed down
by the supreme court during the past term, and all could be decided
readily under the express language of the applicable constitutional
provision relative to jurisdiction of the appellate courts. In two of
these cases29 the supreme court held that it had no jurisdiction over
the appeal taken in a succession matter, inasmuch as the total assets
of the succession had a value of less than two thousand dollars.
The third case, Succession of Raborn, ° presented an interesting
but not particularly difficult question of appellate jurisdiction. The
appeal was from a judgment of the Civil District Court of the
Parish of Orleans, holding that certain United States Savings Bonds
registered in the name of decedent and payable to his sister upon
his death were taxable under the Inheritance Tax Act 8 of the state.
Since the question presented on appeal was the legality of this
inheritance tax on the bonds issued by the federal government, the
supreme court clearly had jurisdiction over the appeal."2
Appellate Procedure
The settled rule that the trial court's findings of fact will not
be disturbed on appeal unless deemed manifestly erroneous received
its annual application in three of the decisions83 of the supreme
court. In another case, 4 the court applied the settled rule that the
29. Succession of Ethridge, 210 La. 1088, 29 So. (2d) 55 (1946); Succession
of Dugas, 211 La. 544, 80 So. (2d) 425 (1947).
30. 210 La. 1033, 29 So. (2d) 53 (1946).
31. La. Act 127 of 1921 (E. S.)j as amended.
82. The supreme court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction in all cases "wherein the legality of any tax . . . levied by the State . . . shall be in contest." La.
Const. of 1921, Art. 7, § 10.
83. Pittman Contracting Co. v. City Home Builders, 211 La. 549, 30 So. (2d)
426 (19t7); Wojahn v. Soniat, 211 La. 562, 80 So. (2d) 431 (1947); Meridian
Land and Mineral Corp. v. Bagents, 211 La. 627, 30 So. (2d) 563 (1947).
84. Borgnemouth Realty Co. v. Gulf Soap Corp., 211 La. 255, 29 So. (2d)
841 (1947).
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jurisdiction of the trial court is divested by the timely filing of a
suspensive appeal bond.

Carrere v. Reddix" presented the very interesting question of
whether, under the facts of the case, the Recorder of Mortgages for
the Parish of Orleans had a sufficient interest to appeal from a
judgment of the trial court. Defendant had sold certain property
in New Orleans for cash to plaintiff. At this time there was a first
mortgage affecting the property and the purchaser used a portion
of the purchase price to pay this mortgage indebtedness, the inscription of which subsequently was cancelled on the records of the
mortgage office. Subsequently it was discovered that Reddix did
not have good title to the property sold inasmuch as a one-half
interest therein was owned by the children of his first marriage.
Under these circumstances, plaintiff filed suit against the named
defendant and the heirs of his deceased first wife to annul the act
of sale, to reinstate the first mortgage against the property, to have
the plaintiff subrogated to the rights of the former mortgage creditor
and to have the property sold under the reinstated mortgage to
satisfy the amount thereof. The recorder of mortgages was made
a defendant in the proceedings and as to him the plaintiff prayed
that he be ordered to reinstate the mortgage as originally inscribed.
The trial judge granted plaintiff all relief prayed for with the exception that he refused to order the recorder of mortgages to reinscribe
the original mortgage. Plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal prosecuted by the recorder of mortgages on the ground that he was without interest in the matter inasmuch as he was not affected by the
judgment of the court below. This motion to dismiss was overruled
by the supreme court8 6 Subsequently when the appeal was considered on its merits, the court concluded that it had acted erroneously in refusing to dismiss the appeal previously. Since the
recorder had not been ordered by the judgment reinstating the
mortgage to reinscribe the same or to perform any other act in relation thereto, he was held to be without sufficient interest to prosecute any appeal.
The court in Betz v. Riviere8 7 gave recognition to the trite rule
that a judgment appealed from cannot be amended in favor of
appellee in the absence of any answer to the appeal.
85. 211 La. 566, 30 So. (2d) 432 (1947).
36. Carrere v. Reddix, 210 La. 776, 28 So. (2d) 267 (1946).
37. 211 La. 43, 29 So. (2d) 465 (1947).
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Finding the transcript of appeal incomplete, the appellee in
LaGraize v. Tracy3" first ruled the appellant in the court to show
cause why certain documents allegedly omitted from the transcript
should not be included therein. After argument, this rule was dismissed in view of the fact that the original documents in question
had been sent up to the appellate court along with the transcript of
appeal. A month or so later counsel for the appellee realized that
the transcript had not been timely filed by appellant, and moved to
dismiss the appeal on this ground. In view of the first action taken
by appellee, the court held that the latter had waived his rights to
dismiss the appeal.
The appeal in Graves v. D'Artois"9 was dismissed on the ground
that the order of appeal had been rendered at a term subsequent to
that in which the judgment had been rendered, and that the appellant had failed to pray for citation of appeal upon the appellee. In
view of the express language of the applicable code provision,"
actual knowledge by counsel for the appellee of the pending appeal
was held immaterial.
A motion to dismiss the appeal was presented in Redon v. Armstrong,41 on the ground that the suspensive appeal required a bond
of five thousand dollars, that the sureties on the bond furnished
were solvent only to the extent of two thousand dollars, and that
appellants had failed to furnish additional security. The record indicated that in the trial court appellee had moved to test the solvency
of the sureties on the first two bonds presented by appellant, and in
both cases the trial judge had found that these sureties were not
solvent to the extent to which they had bound themselves. The
solvency of the surety on the third suspensive appeal bond furnished
by the appellant likewise was tested in the trial court, and the latter
found this surety to be solvent only to the extent of two thousand
dollars. Thereafter the appellant failed to furnish additional security and the motion to dismiss, based upon these facts, was filed in
the appellate court. Although it found the bond insufficient to
maintain a suspensive appeal from the judgment of the court
below, the majority of the supreme court held the bond to be sufficient to support a devolutive appeal. Chief Justice O'Niell dissented.
38.
39.
40.
41.

211 La. 765, 30 So. (2d)
210 La. 857, 28 So. (2d)
Arts. 581-583, La. Code
211 La. 165, 29 So. (2d)

828 (1947).
457 (1946).
of Practice of 1870.
708 (1947).
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On the original appeal in Cillufa v. Monreale Realty Company,42 the supreme court reversed the judgment appealed from,
holding that the prescription of one year was no bar to the plaintiff's
action to annul a judgment against him obtained by the defendant
on an alleged confession of judgment. This decision of the appellate
court was held to constitute the law of the case, hence the trial court
was held to have acted erroneously in sustaining this prescription
after the case had been remanded to the latter for further proceedings. The second judgment of the trial court was reversed on the
second appeal, and the supreme court annulled the original judgment obtained under the void confession of judgment.
Under the statute authorizing the appellate courts to impose
costs upon the parties as they deem equitable,43 costs of appeal were
imposed upon appellant in Pittman Contracting Company v. City
Home Builders,44 even though appellant succeeded in reducing the
quantum of the judgment appealed from. The trial court had erred
in its determination of the proper rental due under a lease of machinery from plaintiff to defendant, and had rendered judgment
accordingly. Inasmuch as no effort had been made by the defendant to correct this error through an application for a new trial, the
judgment appealed from was amended but all costs of appeal were
imposed upon the successful appellant.
The effect of the death of a litigant upon pending litigation
was considered in two cases decided by the supreme court during
the past term. In Navarro v. Derbes,45 the defendant had died prior
to the rendition of judgment against him in the trial court. Notwithstanding this fact, his heirs had been substituted as parties defendant and sued out an appeal from the judgment in question.
On motion of the appellee this appeal was dismissed, the appellate
court holding that the judgment of the trial court against a party
deceased was an absolute nullity.
In Lovell P. Fitzpatrick," three plaintiffs had brought a petitory
action against two defendants. Prior to the trial one of the plaintiffs
died intestate leaving as her sole heirs at law the other two plaintiffs.
After the trial, both of the original defendants died. By proper
procedure all of the heirs of the above mentioned deceased litigants
were substituted as parties litigant. However, after the appeal in
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

211
La.
211
211
211

La.
Act
La.
La.
La.

701,
229
549,
384,
262,

80
of
80
30
29

So. (2d) 761
1910, § 2.
So. (2d) 426
So. (2d) 126
So. (2d) 843

(1947).
(1947).
(1947).
(1947).
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the case had been perfected, another of the plaintiffs died testate,
leaving his estate to non-resident legatees. Under the provisions of
Rule XIV, Section 3, of the Supreme Court, these non-resident
legatees were substituted as parties plaintiff and summoned through
the constructive process therein provided. Both of these non-resident
legatees failed to answer the summons timely and defendants prosecuted the appeal to a conclusion. Even though the latter failed to
make any appearance in the appellate court, the trial court's judgment against their ancestors in litigation was affirmed on appeal,
and held binding upon these substituted plaintiffs.
The reasoning of the supreme court is rather difficult to follow
in three cases where the appellees moved to dismiss the appeal because of a failure to file the transcript timely, two of these47 brought
up for review under certiorari decisions of the First Circuit Court
of Appeal. The latter had dismissed two appeals prosecuted to it on
the ground that the transcripts were not timely filed. After the
orders for appeal had been rendered, the clerk of the district court
on September 21, 1945, prepared the transcripts, notified counsel for
the defendants that they were ready and further informed him that
these appeals were returnable on October 1, 1945. On November
10, 1945, the clerk of the district court received a check from counsel
for the appellant in payment of the filing fees; whereupon he forwarded the records, together with the fees to the court of appeal for
filing. Based upon the above facts, the appellee moved to dismiss
both appeals on the ground that the transcripts of appeal had not
been timely filed; that the delay in filing was not attributable in
any way to the clerk of the district court, but was due entirely to
the failure of the appellant to advance the necessary filing fees
timely. These motions to dismiss were maintained by the intermediate appellate court.4" In reversing the judgments of the court

of appeal, the supreme court felt called upon to interpret the
language of Act 32 of 1910, which makes it the duty of the clerk
of the district court to transmit the transcript of appeal to the clerk
of the court of appeal whenever the advance cost deposit has been
paid to the former. The language of this statute was construed as
imposing the duty of forwarding the transcript of appeal solely upon
the clerk of the district court and to relieve the appellant of any
47. Osborne v. Mossier Acceptance Corp., 210 La. 1048, 29 So. (2d) 58 (1946);
Id., 210 La. 1054, 29 So. (2d) 60 (1946).
48. Osborne v. Mossler Acceptance Corp, 24 So. (2d) 655 (La. App. 1946);
Id., 24 So. (2d) 657 (La. App. 1946).
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obligation in this respect.49 Further, the word "whenever" was
interpreted so as to require the performance of this duty by the
clerk of the district court in all cases where the appeal deposit was
paid to him, regardless of the timeliness of such payment. The
payment of the appeal costs deposit was held not to be a prerequisite
to the forwarding of the record to the court of appeal by the clerk
of the district court. Under this line of reasoning, the court concluded that the delay in perfecting this appeal was not imputable
to counsel for the appellant. A more logical construction of the
statute, and one which has heretofore been assumed, is that the
clerk is not obliged to forward the transcript unless the deposit has
been made and that appellant is responsible for a timely payment
of the costs deposit.
A much more technical position was assumed by the supreme
court in Vicknair v. Vicknair.5 ° The extended return day for the
filing of the transcript was October 19, 1946, which happened to be
a Saturday. The transcript was not lodged in the appellate court
until the succeeding Monday, October 21st. Based upon this latter
fact, the appellee moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that
the transcript was not timely filed. The appellant argued that since
Saturday was a half-holiday under Act 239 of 1942, he had all of
the next legal day for the perfection of the appeal. Chief Justice
O'Niell, as the organ of the court, swept aside this argument with
the statement that it might possess some merit if in extending the
time within which the transcript might be filed the court had
merely stated the number of days, but that since the return day
was extended to a given date, and the office of the clerk was open
that morning, the court had no alternative except to dismiss the
appeal. The effect of Saturday half holidays has been the subject
of considerable litigation in the past,5 1 and the principal case leaves
the question even more wide open than under previous decisions.
A more liberal attitude on the part of the court might easily have
permitted it to have reached a contrary conclusion. The court's
argument "that when an appellee is entitled to have the appeal dismissed, the court has no right to deprive him of that advantage"
49. Whether the obligation of lodging the transcript of appeal in the appellate court is imposed upon the appellant or upon the clerk of the trial court
depends upon the language of the statutory provision governing the particular
appellate court. For an excellent discussion of these rules, see Note (1941) 15
Tulane L. Rev. 804.
50. 211 La. 159, 29 So. (2d) 706 (1947).
51. The cases on this subject are discussed in The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1945-1946 Term, 7 LouisiANA LAw REvizw 165, 270-271
(1946).
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merely begs the very question presented for a decision. The result
reached by the court appears to be unnecessarily technical and hardly
in harmony with the modern trend of liberality of procedure.
Conservatory Writs
Mossler Acceptance Company v. Demark " presented a question
which was res nova in Louisiana. The defendant's automobiles were
seized under a writ of attachment issued at the instance of plaintiff.
Plaintiff thereupon moved in the trial court to have this property
recognized as being of a perishable nature and to have it sold as
such immediately. To review a judgment of the trial court holding
that automobiles are perishable property within the intendment of
the applicable code provision, defendant invoked the supervisory
jurisdiction of the supreme court. In the latter, defendant relied
upon the decisions of other jurisdictions contruing analogous statutory provisions. Pointing out that under the applicable code provision, seized property could not be considered as being of a perishable nature unless it was "subject to be lost or deteriorated during
the pendency of the suit," and that the evidence submitted did not
satisfy these requirements, the court annulled the judgment of the
trial court under review.
Various aspects of injunction procedure was the subject of
several decisions rendered by the supreme court during the past
term. Some of these cases announced rules so elementary as to permit of a mere statement of the action taken by the court. In one, 3
the supreme court again recognized the rule that covenants running
with the title to immovable property, under certain circumstances,
might be enforced by injunction. In Rea v. Nelson54 only issues of
fact were presented to the court for determination. The plaintiff,
alleging himself to be the owner of all of the stock of a corporation
which was being liquidated under the instructons of the defendant
who was in possession of the certificates of all of the stock of the
corporation, sought judicial recognition of his ownership of the
stock and injunctive relief to prevent further liquidation of the corporation. Both the trial court and the supreme court decided the
factual issues presented adversely to plaintiff, recognized the defendant as being owner of the shares of stock in question, and refused the injunctive relief prayed for.
52. 31 So. (2d) 216 (La. 1947).
53. Salerno v. DeLucca, 211 La. 659, 30 So. (2d) 678 (1947).
54. 210 La. 1011, 29 So. (2d) 45 (1946).
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An attorney sought injunctive relief from the court in Tennant
v. Russell,55 so as to prevent husband and wife from disposing of
certain community property in which the attorney alleged an interest acquired under a contingent fee contract. Following a legal
separation between husband and wife, an amicable partition of the
community property was affected between them. Subsequently,
feeling that she had not received her fair share of the property of
the community, the wife employed the plaintiff attorney to annul
the partition. A suit in the name of the wife to effect this result,
and further seeking to enjoin her husband from disposing of the
property formerly belonging to the community, was duly instituted.
On the trial on the rule for injunctive relief, another attorney employed by the wife was entered as counsel of record and through
the latter the wife moved to dismiss the proceeding. The trial judge
refused to grant the motion for discontinuance on the ground that
the first attorney, under his contingent fee contract, had acquired
an interest in the property in question. Pending further efforts by
husband and wife to effect the dismissal of this litigation, the first
attorney instituted the present suit seeking to enforce his alleged
vested interest in the property which he had obtained under the
contingent fee contract, praying for injunctive relief to prevent the
husband from disposing of the property and asking for an inventory of all of the property belonging to the community. The court
below, on the trial of plaintiff's rule, granted the preliminary injunction and ordered that the community effects be inventoried. Defendant, after unsuccessfully applying to the trial court for a suspensive appeal from this interlocutory judgment, invoked the supervisory jurisdiction from the supreme court to obtain this relief.
Although the contingent fee contract executed between the
wife and her former attorney transferred to the latter a one-fourth
contingent interest in certain property as a consideration for his
services, this agreement nowhere contained any language prohibiting
the wife from dismissing any suits brought by her attorney. Under
previous interpretations of the pertinent statute,56 the court held
that a client always is privileged to compromise and discontinue
any proceedings instituted in his behalf by counsel, unless the contract of employment between the two expressly prohibited such
action by the client. Accordingly, the court concluded that the
55. 210 La. 1092, 29 So. (2d) 167 (1946).
56. La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, §§ 128, 2897, as amended by La. Act 124 of
1906.
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plaintiff attorney was without right to the injunctive relief prayed
for, and that necessarily a suspensive appeal should have been
granted defendant from the judgment granting interlocutory injunctive relief.
Borgnemouth Redty Company v. Gulf Soap Corporation" pre-

sented an extremely interesting question of appeal from an injunctive order. The suit was filed to abate an alleged nuisance, to enjoin
the defendant from continuing the operation of its rendering plant,
and to recover damages allegedly sustained. On filing their petition,
plaintiffs obtained a rule upon defendant to show cause why preliminary injunctive relief should not be granted. At the time of
the trial of this rule, the parties agreed that the case should be heard
and disposed of on its merits. Thereafter, the trial judge permanently enjoined the continued operation of the plant, awarded the
plaintiffs judgment for damages sustained and decreed the removal
of defendant's plant at its expense. Defendant duly obtained an
order for a suspensive appeal and filed the bond therefor timely.
On motion of the plaintiffs, the trial judge, subsequent to the filing
of the appeal bond, modified his order of appeal so as to set aside
th suspensive appeal and to grant only a devolutive one. Under
its supervisory jurisdiction, the supreme court set aside the modified
appeal order and restored the order for a suspensive appeal previously rendered by the trial judge, holding that after the filing of
the appeal bond the trial court was divested of jurisdiction for all
purposes except to test the sufficiency of the bond and to transfer
the record to the appellate court. The supreme court further pointed
out that the only judgment rendered by the court was a final one
decreeing a permanent injunction and that nothing in the injunction act prevented the defendant from obtaining a suspensive appeal
therefrom as a matter of right.
Miscellaneous
8 the plaintiff,
In Foshee v. Kirby Lumber Corporation,"
natural

tutrix, had recovered judgment in the trial court for damages sustained through defendant's cutting and removal of timber on land
alleged to belong to plaintiff's son. In the trial court, defendant had
excepted unsuccessfully to plaintiff's petition as disclosing neither a
right nor cause of action, and in its answer had pleaded that defendant had purchased the timber in question under a written sale
57. 211 La. 255, 29 So. (2d) 841 (1947).
58. 31 So. (2d) 419 (La. 1947).
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by plaintiff of all of th.t timber on her son's lands. The controversy
turned on the Correct description of the small tract from which this
timber had been cut. Under all of the acts of sale of the land to the
son's ancestors in title, as well as under the act of sale of the timber
by plaintiff to defendant, this tract was described as being in Section
1 of a certain township. Through the possibility of error in the original government survey, however, some contention was available
that this tract actually was in Section 4 of the same township. Based
upon this possibility, plaintiff contended that the timber cut by defendant had not been included within the previous sale. In reversing
the judgment appealed from, the supreme court held that the tract
in question was included within the description of the land on which
plaintiff had sold the timber to defendant. It was further pointed out
that if not so included, plaintiff's son had no title thereto since all
of the deeds had used the identical description employed in the sale
of timber to defendant. The rule that a defendant sued for trespass
cannot question the title of a plaintiff in possession was held inapposite to the facts of the case, since plaintiff was not in possession
and defendant was merely cutting the timber sold it by plaintiff. In
a per curiam opinion rendered in connection with an application for
rehearing, the court receded somewhat from its original position, by
calling attention to the fact that its original decree was founded primarily and ultimately upon the position that the tract of land in
controversy was included within the description of the lands from
which defendant had purchased the timber.
In one case,59 an application for a re-opening of a succession and
the appointment of the applicant as administrator thereof was disposed of through the application of trite rules of succession procedure. The application for administration, presented by one of the
heirs at law recognized by a judgment of possession rendered four
years before, merely recited the discovery of additional assets of the
succession as the reason for the administration. Since the estate was a
large one, entirely free from debt and no unusual circumstances
justifying any administration thereof was recited by the applicant,
both the trial and appellate courts refused to grant the application.
An interesting question of receivership procedure was presented
in Gough v. State Realty Company."0 The receiver's application in
the trial court for authority to sell at private sale the one remaining
asset of the receivership, a tract of unimproved rural property having
59.,Suceession of Land, 31 So. (2d) 607 (La. 1947).
60. 210 La. 1055, 29 So. (2d) 60 (1946).
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some speculative value for future subdivision purposes, was opposed
by the largest shareholder of the corporation in receivership. The
grounds of this opposition were that the price offered was insufficient and that there was no necessity for the sale of this property at
the present time. Both the trial and appellate courts resolved these
factual issues against the opponent, finding that the price offered
was fair and that it was to the best interest of all concerned to sell
the property at the time. The record indicated, however, that though
the receivership had been in existence for some years, there had never
been any inventory and appraisement of the property in controversy.
Based upon this, the opponent contended that no valid sale of the
property could be made, since there was no way of determining
whether the property would bring two-thirds of its appraised price
under the proposed sale. This argument was swept aside by the
supreme court, which held that the requirement of a bid of twothirds or more of the appraised price at the first offering was applicable only to public receivership sales under Louisiana Act 159 of
1898, and had no application to private sales of receivership property
authorized under Louisiana Act 43 of 1924.
Dixie Homestead Association v. Redden"' presented a somewhat
unusual use of interpleader procedure. A property on which the
plaintiff association held a mortgage was damaged as the result of
fire. Both the association and the owner were protected by a fire insurance policy containing the standard mortgage clause. On being
advised of the fire loss, the association requested its architect to ascertain the cost of repairing the damage, and the supreme court found
as a fact that the selection of this architect was tacitly approved by
the property owner. In adjusting the loss, the insurance carrier issued
its check payable jointly to the association and to the property owner.
This check was for the estimated cost of repairing the damage, together with an additional ten per cent thereof to cover the fee of the
architect under the policy provision including within the coverage
"the fees of architects necessary to be incurred in repairs or reconstruction." After endorsement of the insurance company's check by
both payees, the association deducted from the proceeds thereof the
amount of the mortgage indebtedness, withheld the architect's fees
and attempted to remit the balance to the property owner. Upon the
latter's refusal to accept the amount tendered, the association deposited the amount of the architect's fees into the registry of the
court and impleaded both the property owner and the architect to
61. 210 La. 789, 28 So. (2d) 271 (1946).

1948]

WORK OF THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT

279

assert their respective claims against the fund. The trial court in
effect held that the case fell within the general rule that an ordinary
creditor of the owner of a fund may not assert his claim against the
debtor in an interpleader proceeding, 2 and awarded the amount
deposited to the property owner, assessing all costs against the plaintiff association. The intermediate appellate court likewise held that
the architect had no claim to the fund deposited, but dismissed the
interpleader proceeding as having been improperly brought, reserving the right of plaintiff association to the refund of the amount
deposited.' Under certiorari, the supreme court upheld the right of
the association to use the interpleader statute to protect itself against
the conflicting claims of the property owner and the architect, and
awarded the fund deposited to the latter. In view of the architect's
contention that the insurance company's purpose in paying this
amount was to cover the payment of his fees, the court differentiated
the case from those coming within the application of the general
rule. In this respect the decision of the supreme court appears sound
and will have the effect of liberalizing the use of interpleader proceedings. Its decision, however, does not make out as convincing a
case as might be desired on the award of the entire fund to the architect. The supreme court's opinion somehow leaves the reader with
the impression that it felt the architect's fee was paid for services
rendered only in adjusting the insurance claim. The policy provision, however, is express in covering "the fees of architects necessary to be incurred in repairs or reconstruction."
In two cases,64 the plaintiffs were saved from a dismissal of the
suits by their alternative prayers for reformation of the instrument
sued on. In both, the trial court maintained an exception of no cause
of action and dismissed the entire suit. In both, the supreme court
maintained the exception insofar as plaintiff's primary demand was
concerned, but found the petition's allegations sufficient to sustain
the alternative prayer for reformation, and remanded the proceeding for trial on this issue.
In Lindsey v. Caraway6" plaintiff primarily sought to annul an
instrument through which the plaintiffs transferred a mineral lease
to the defendant. The petition and documents annexed thereto in62. In re Employers' Liability Assur. Corporation, 180 La. 406, 156 So. 447

(1934).
63. Dixie Homestead Ass'n v. Redden, 21 So. (2) 194 (La. App. 1945).
64. Lindsey v. Caraway, 211 La. 398, 80 So. (2d) 182 (1947) and Weber v.
H. G. Hill Stores Co., 210 La. 977, 29 So. (2d) 33 (1946).
65. 211 La. 398, 30 So. (2d) 182 (1947).
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dicated that the litigants first executed a preliminary instrument,
along with the escrow agent named therein, under which the plaintiffs agreed to transfer the lease to defendants for a cash consideration and an overriding royalty. Since plaintiffs were not sure that the
lease included a full interest in the property, the preliminary agreement provided that if plaintiffs' leasehold interest was less on any of
the property affected by the lease, the overriding royalty would be
reduced proportionately on the particular land. Subsequently, a second instrument was executed by the litigants, under which plaintiffs conveyed their interest in the lease to defendants. This latter
document contained a proviso which was not sanctioned by the preliminary agreement, alleged to have been inserted by defendants'
attorney without authority from any of the contracting parties,
which provided that if the leasehold interest transferred did not include a full interest on any of the lands affected, the overriding
royalty would be reduced proportionately as to all land affected by
the lease. As the petition contained no allegations of fraud sufficient
to justify a judicial cancellation of the second instrument, the exception was maintained as to plaintiff's primary demand for cancellation. However, since the allegations did disclose mutual error of the
contracting parties in the execution of the second instrument, the
case was reversed and remanded for trial on plaintiff's alternative
prayer for reformation.
In Weber v. H. G. Hill Stores Company,"6 the plaintiff sued
primarily for additional rentals allegedly due under a written lease
as construed by plaintiff, and in the alternative for a reformation of
the lease agreement so as to make it conform to plaintiff's interpretation, which was averred to have been the real agreement and intention of the contracting parties. In construing the lease agreement
annexed to plaintiff's petition, the supreme court rejected the plaintiff's interpretation thereof and the primary demand based thereon.
However, since the allegations of the petition definitely averred an
agreement between both the contracting parties different from that
indicated by the express language of the lease agreement itself, the
supreme court held that a cause of action was stated on plaintiff's
alternative demand for reformation, and remanded the proceedings
for trial thereon.
66. 210 La. 977, 29 So. (2d) 88 (1946).

